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Abstract
Citizens of the United States have been conditioned to believe that rule by democracy is
the most free and fair method of governing. If we hold this to be true, I inquire: why do some
postmodern Arab states appear resistant to the spread of democracy within government? In order
to fully evaluate the merits of a democratic form of government, it is important to analyze the
obstacles that hinder its success. Within this research, the gap that I have identified concerns how
the overall quality of a nation’s economy affects its ability to transition to democracy in the
Middle East region. I hypothesize that Arab nations facing economic struggle are less likely to
experience a smooth transition to democracy. My initial argument contended that an overall
decrease in citizen satisfaction can sometimes result from a diminished economy, potentially
leading to lowered motivation and lessened democratic participation. However, after studying
Egypt’s economy, I now argue that the Egyptian military’s heavy-handed involvement in the
government is the more prominent inhibitor of democratization in Egypt. The technique that
I employ in my research is the case- study method, focusing on Egypt. Egypt possesses a weak
economy and has experienced a rocky changeover to democracy, making it highly suitable for
this study. The case study method is preferable because it provides for one the ability to take a
holistic approach, and delve deeply into the country under investigation. This narrative analysis
of Egypt draws from history, anthropology, economics, sociology, and political science.
Additionally, I rely on other data sources, like Country Watch, in order to identify the patterns
within the Egyptian economy and to determine how they affect the quality of its
transitioning democracy.
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Getting to Know Democracy and Egypt
Western scholars have long contended that rule by democracy is the most free and fair
method of governing. If this is truly the case, I inquire: why do some postmodern Arab states
appear resistant to the spread of democracy? If the democratic ideals that we, as citizens, ascribe
value to are as advantageous as we claim, it would appear contradictory that certain nations face
such great opposition in their transition to this form of government. This topic is of significant
importance to the area of political science, and to democratic societies in general, as it allows us
to fully gauge the merits of a democratic republic. In order to observe how effective democracy
is, it is necessary to identify its shortcomings. A significant portion of citizens in developed
nations live under democratic rule, and without this analysis of when, and how democracy
succeeds, it can be difficult to improve upon it.
Understanding the differences in mindset between successful and unsuccessful
democratic transitions is a key step in creating lasting reform to remedy the issues that ail the
unsuccessful states. The completion of this study attempts to identify the primary obstacles that
stand in the way of democratization, and hopefully could influence the way that both
humanitarian workers and citizens of the Arab world approach the push for democracy in these
regions. The literature demands more attention as it pertains to the Middle East and the
relationship between the quality of a nation’s economy and the impact it has on the transition to
democracy in the Middle East region. This area of study still contains important topics left to
analyze within this region and I argue that this factor has the potential to be a significant
influence on democratization. I agree with the majority of other authors that Arab nations facing
economic struggle are less likely to experience a smooth transition to democracy. My initial
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hypothesis was that an overall decrease in citizen satisfaction can often result from a diminished
economy, potentially leading to an increased focus by the incumbent government to restructure
the economic sector. I reasoned that, this can lead to government shifting its focus away from
democratic reform toward economic structing, in an attempt to appease the population and hold
onto power. After completing my analysis, I later reached the conclusion that the Egyptian
government’s close relationship and historical ties to the Egyptian armed forces are the more
relevant and prominent inhibitor of democratization. The technique that I employ in my research
is the case- study method, focusing on Egypt. Since the ousting of Mubarak during the Arab
Spring in 2011, Egypt has struggled with a weak economy and as a result, experienced a rocky
transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The case study method is preferable because it
provides for one the ability to take a holistic approach, and for another to delve deeply into the
country under investigation. This narrative analysis of Egypt draws from the disciplines of
history, anthropology, economics, sociology, and political science. Additionally, I rely on other
data sources, like Country Watch, to identify the patterns within the Egyptian economy to
determine how they affect the quality of its transitioning democracy.
This thesis begins with a literature review, detailing the opinions of scholars on this topic.
The third section lays out the project’s theoretical framework. This serves to elucidate the
reasoning behind my argument in greater depth. A section on data collection and analysis is
included next, in order to explain which techniques were implemented to gather data, before
analyzing interdisciplinary information derived from various scholars. After completing the
analysis, I examine the flaws in my research, and offer suggestions for future explorations on this
topic.
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This subject matter is particularly relevant, particularly when analyzed within the
framework of the post- Cold War era. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the end of the Cold
War, a tide of democracy swept over Eastern Europe. The clash of ideologies in this conflict
ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leaving one dominant mode of governing among
the majority of developed countries. The collapse of Communism served as a symbolic victory
for democracy, causing a cultural shift in regions such as Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the
Middle East (JFK Library, 10). With the proliferation of democratic forms of government, it will
be increasingly important to study the process of democratization, and help facilitate a smoother
transition for nations looking to shift their governmental structure.
Historical Description of the Arab Spring
This section provides background and establishes the context needed to understand my
research on Egypt, and the political climate in the surrounding region. I focus on the Arab Spring
in particular, as it has been a turning point for the region in a number of ways. In 2011, a tide of
revolts swept across the Middle East, beginning with Tunisian Revolution. The democratic
protests in Tunis sparked a trend that spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, all of
which experienced similar demonstrations and political revolution. Eventually, citizens in
Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Morocco, Jordan, joined the large- scale movement, with other Arab
nations experiencing lesser democratic protests. The people of these states were primarily
provoked to action by their ruling authoritarian governments (Ismael, 210). Many of these
regimes were infamous for their innate political corruption, counts of human rights violations,
and their gross misuse of power. The democratic movements in response to this varied from
nation to nation, but often included public demonstrations, social media movements, civil
disobedience, and occasionally riots and armed conflict. (Ismael, 214). Many of these Arab
3

citizens pursued rule by democracy, greater oversight in the area of human rights, free and fair
elections, as well as economic freedom. The various Arab states experienced different results,
but nearly all major participants saw significant change on some level (political, social, legal,
etc.) In the case of Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak was ousted, arrested, and charged with the
crimes that he had committed while in office for three decades (1991-2011). The government
ended up being overthrown and replaced with a transitioning democracy (Malloch-Brown, 1).
Implications of the Arab Spring
The Arab Spring brought about enormous waves of change, reverberating through the
cultures, communities, societies, governments, and economies of most Arab states. After
establishing the factual, historical narrative in relation to the events of the 2011 revolution, this
segment analyzes how these events shaped the region into what it is today.
Some scholars describe the significance of the Arab Spring as a challenge to the status
quo of oppression and subjugation, that defined many states in region for decades (Ismael, 375).
In addition to the underlying motif of defiance and revolution that was apparent throughout the
revolution, many other academics focus on the economic facet of the Arab Spring. The political
movements unfolded differently in countries that were more prosperous than others, highlighting
the disparity between rich and poor Middle Eastern countries. The political revolts across the
Middle East served to further underline the distinction between these states, and shine a light on
the wealth inequality that plagues some of these wealthier countries (i.e. Libya). With
meaningful economic growth only being enjoyed by the upper-crust of Arab society, this
perceived injustice created another social and economic change brought about by the Arab
Spring (Malloch-Brown, 8).
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In this post-revolution environment, Arab nations were also mired with questions of
stability. In the case of Egypt, the democratic transition was initially met with adjoining
liberalization efforts by members of the military. This was highly significant, as the military
holds a significant portion of Egypt’s political power. Despite these limited democratic changes
supported by the Egyptian military, the success of this process will be decided by whether or not
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is willing to cede power to civilian and political
leaders (Miller, 293). This conundrum raises another implication of the Arab Spring: the powervacuum. Some states, such as Egypt, experienced these widespread power-vacuums after
completing their political revolution. In these occurrences, the downfall of the status-quo
government has created a potentially volatile situation where multiple groups are vying for
power in certain states. Alongside the changes in political opinion, and the internal shifts in
power brought about by the 2011 revolutions, some scholars point to legal changes brought
about in specific Arab states. Sociologist Jasper Doomen is one of these individuals, holding that
the existing set of laws in Middle Eastern nations will no longer suffice in the post-revolution
era. In Political Stability After the Arab Spring, the writer argues that a new legal code will now
be needed to govern the populace, and maintain their basic rights in this new democratic setting
(Doomen, 399).
After progressing through a brief overview of Egypt’s place in the middle east region,
and introducing the core concepts necessary to grasp the subject matter of this study, we begin to
analyze the existing literature on these topics. This upcoming section will build upon the general
notions broached in the introduction, and will serve to better the observer’s understanding of the
theories within the current research on democratization.
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Egypt’s History
A brief discussion on the general history of Egypt is also in order, as to give the observer
an overlook at the social, cultural, and traditional norms of the country. This will be important as
to aid the reader in understanding why certain facets of Egyptian life, politics, and governance
exist in their current form. Although it would be impractical to give a thorough analysis of
nation’s vast and storied history, I look to present a glimpse of key time periods that have shaped
Egypt into the country that it is today. The majority of these periods are drawn from Egypt’s
early archaic history, which serve to explain many of the hereditary and monarchal traits that can
still be observed in the recent history of Egypt’s national leadership. These early time periods
also contain valuable information in regard to the nation’s economic tendencies and practices.
Additionally, this section helps to establish the historical basis for the influence of the powerful
Egyptian military.
The state of Egypt is estimated to be established in what is referred to as the Early
Dynastic period, from C.3100-2636 B.C. This period saw the creation of two separate kingdoms
by nomadic stone age people, residing in the area that would eventually become present-day
Egypt. In roughly C.3300, King Menes, leader of the southern kingdom, leads a campaign that
usurps the northern kingdom and merges the state of Egypt, becoming the nation’s first monarch
(Assman, 27).
Egypt continued development and expansion throughout the next several centuries,
experiencing a length period of economic success and diplomatic peace. This era is often
referred to as the Old Kingdom, and lasted from C. 2686-2181 B.C. With a healthy economy and
no foreign enemies to threaten Egypt’s borders, the country accrued a significant stockpile of
capital and resources (History, 3). However, mismanagement of Egypt’s wealth by the Pharaohs
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and elites of the fifth and sixth dynasties led to the monarchy’s war chests being significantly
lightened by the end of the period, thanks in no small part to the national efforts to build the
pyramids of Giza (Assman, 50).
One of the next periods of significance in Egypt’s history is the 12th dynasty, often
referred to as the Middle Kingdom. This period saw the rise of an assertive Egyptian foreign
policy bent on expansion. Aggressive military action directed toward the southern border
resulted in the colonization of Nubia, establishing Egypt’s position as a dominant power in the
region. In this way, Egypt cemented its place as a military force to be reckoned with in the north
African territories (History, 4). The country’s economic, military, and political characteristics
mentioned in these epochs will become increasingly salient in the analysis portion of this thesis,
where I explore Egypt’s inherent traits that are potentially inhibiting its democratization.
To conclude this section, we advance forward into the modern era and briefly progress
through some of Egypt’s recent history as to place the 2011 Arab Spring in its proper context. In
1914 Egypt becomes a British protectorate after a lengthy, rocky relationship with the European
power. In 1922 Egypt regains its independence through King Fuad I, but is still partially subject
to British influence over the next three decades. Fast forward to 1953, Muhammad Najib takes
office as the nation’s president and Egypt is proclaimed to be a democratic republic. 1981 marks
the beginning of the Mubarak presidency, with the executive office-holder limiting political
freedoms, demonstrations, and protests, despite Egypt’s status as a supposedly democratic
nation. After decades of alleged human rights violations and interfering in national elections,
President Mubarak eventually resigns in 2011 and relinquishes control of the country over to the
army (BBC, 15).
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Literature Review
An Overview of Democratization
Understanding this study requires a general knowledge of the modern Middle East
region, but additionally, also mandates that the observer can comprehend the conceptual aspect
of democratization. Democratization refers to the transition that nations undergo, as their system
of government converts from a non-democracy to a democracy. This process is vast, and
contains several working parts that meld together, in order to hypothetically form a working
democracy. The process is also affected in numerous ways by different variables that can occur
from country to country, with democratization being influenced either internally, externally, or
both (Call, 135). In the spirit of practicality, this introduction will paint in broad strokes,
identifying the most core pieces of democratization, and elaborating on the most common
influencers of the democratization process. This section will present an overview of
democratization in order to adequately familiarize readers who have no experience with the
general subject. Additionally, the section utilizes of examples from instances of democratic
transition from around the world, allowing both researchers and observers to consider the
experiences of other regions, before examining the Arab world.
Components of Working Democracies
As described by James Dobbins in A Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building,
democratization must fulfill certain key steps before the process is considered complete, and a
working democracy is in place. The components to a successful democratization are detailed to
be: the structuring of representative institutions, the drafting of a national constitution, the
development of civil society, the creation of a free press, and the organization of free and fair
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elections (Dobbins, 191). In addressing the significance of each element, representative
institutions are necessary in order to ensure that the general public’s interests are accounted for,
and to act as a check on the executive branch’s power to influence legislation. The creation of a
written constitution is integral to the democratization process, as it allows for detailed the
expression of the nation’s values and creates a baseline measurement for future lawmaking.
As illustrated by Dobbins, the development of civil society takes place in the
“resuscitating, fostering, and protecting,” of any citizens or interest groups that fall victim to
violence. This level of oversight is required in order to ensure government accountability
(Dobbins, 190). The creation of a press that is “free, independent, and professionally competent,”
is essential to creating the informed and engage public that democratic societies rely on. Lastly,
establishing free and fair elections are a cornerstone of the democratization process, as they
allow citizens to select politicians who will lobby for their interests (Doomen, 50). Not only is
this final component an important piece of democratization, it is especially valuable in the
democratization of authoritarian regimes. This step introduces the element of competition to
states that traditionally utilize a hegemon who is often impervious to challenge by rival actors
(Donno, 703).
Conversely, Doh Chull Shin characterizes the democratization process by splitting it into
two distinct pieces. Shin argues that in the modern era, democratization occurs both in individual
citizens and in the larger political regime of a country. The author contends that democratization
is more of a “multilayered phenomenon” than other scholars often care to admit (Shin, 327).
Within this school of thought, a successful transition to a working democracy must be
accompanied by change at both levels. Shin holds that there must be a shift in cultural beliefs and
values at the individual level, moving toward democratic ideals and principles, alongside a shift
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in leadership and policy at the political level. This change in government would often include the
installation of elected officials and the drafting of legislation to reflect these same democratic
ideals and principles. An example of such a principle could be the rejection of an authoritarian
decision-making process, in favor of one that encourages participation, debate, and dissent (Shin
328).
Lastly, a working democracy also requires an independent judiciary branch to maintain
law and order within society. Additionally, judiciaries are used to conduct oversight on
government officials, and are often responsible for assessing the constitutionality of laws passed
by the legislative body. Güneş Murat Tezcür details these aspects of the judiciary body in
democratic government, and specifies the importance of these institutions as they apply to
Islamic societies. Tezcür discusses how judiciary systems foster democratic values, mentioning
that “Islamic democracy does not offer any institutions to prevent the tyranny of the religious
majority. Finally, judicial review that is sanctioned by democratically written constitutions, not
subject to control by military elite, and provides open access to citizens, offers the best
protection of individual and minority rights in Islamic societies (Tezcür, 480).
Influencers on Democratization
The process of democratization is dynamic. No two nations experience completely
identical transitions, and not all nations are successful in their adjustment. These influencers can
primarily be broken up into internal and external elements, affecting the country in question from
the inside or the outside. External influencers on democracy include relationships with other
nations, international economies, or global organizations that the state in question belongs to
(Mansfield, 137). For example, outside security threats to a nation have been theorized to affect
the democratization process. However, other scholars pointed out that having settled borders and
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strong relations with neighboring countries does not always guarantee a successful democratic
transition (Oswiak, 717).
Foreign aid plays another external role in the fostering of democracy in some
authoritarian regimes. According to Joseph Wright, this element possesses the capability to
enhance democracy where it is prevalent (Wright 522). Internal elements can often include
support for pro-democracy movements within a state’s population. For this reason, survey data is
sometimes utilized by researchers who are looking to measure the general public’s sentiments
toward democracy. This is done in order to gauge the viability of democratization in a region
(Shin, 239). In addition to this, economic circumstance has often been considered in ascertaining
when democratization succeeds. Take Prussia for instance, with political economists questioning
whether or not landholding inequality had damaged the democratization process in the German
state (Ziblatt, 610). Though this link between economics and democratization has been studied in
the past, I maintain that there is a gap in the literature on how this link has specifically
manifested in post revolution Egypt, as there has not been much time to study this relationship.
Consequences of Democratization
Though the democratization process is described as a transition, it is not necessarily a
fixed set of steps, leading to an idyllic result. For example, in South Korea, a successful
democratization that ended with a functional republic, still continued to encounter serious
problems in the areas of partisanship and politics, affecting the quality of Korea’s democracy.
This goes to show that even when the process is “completed,” many nations still experience
obstacles in governing (Shin, 71). Mexico offers a more extreme example of this phenomena,
often being criticized for the internal violence and limited freedoms that ail the quality of its
democracy, despite decades of transitional efforts. Even when accounting for Mexico’s
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reintroduction of a new constitution on their road to democracy, and the creation of new political
parties to add greater diversity of ideas within governments, the nation continues to be hampered
by issues of crime and violence. These internal problems serve to degrade the quality of
Mexico’s democracy (Ackerman, 10.) Conversely, it is worth mentioning that some democratic
transitions are swift and smooth. Take Spain’s usage of “protodemocratic elements within
government” and allies within the Catholic church in order effectively transition to a relatively
high-quality democracy. Specifically, Spain’s efficient updating of laws and institutions
necessary for democracy helped to usher in this new form of government with relative ease,
(Hipsher, 287).
Not only does this process not necessarily have a designated start and end point, but
scholars are quick to point out that the transition is not only linear. Inequality, Democratization,
and De-Democratization observes that some governments have been observed to transition into a
democratic form of government, before reverting back to their original form of ruling (Tilly, 37).
In addition to the effects that follow successful democratization, there are also consequences of
failure to democratize. Certain researchers have contended that some nations that falter in their
transition process are highly likely to engage in civil war, as a result of their weaker state
institutions (Narang, 357). Such consequences are important to keep in mind, as I examine the
full scope (and potential aftermath) of Egypt’s democratic transition.

Theoretical Framework
Argument
I argue that the mismanagement of the economy by the Egyptian Government and the
subsequent raises in taxes to pair with nation-wide inflation have caused President Sisi to fall out
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of favor with the Egyptian people. This falling out has led to a distaste for government in recent
years and has thus detracted from the overall quality of Egypt’s democracy, in terms of
constitutional liberalism. Without the favor and support of the people, the government is forced
to focus on economic reforms, which explains the state’s resistance to political reforms and
instituting of more democratic practices. Essentially, the poor state of the national economy has
placed massive pressure on the Egyptian Government to reform the economy, forcing political
and democratic improvements to be placed on the backburner.
For this reason, it would logically follow that Egypt’s government would have a vested
interest in repairing its malnourished economy, rather than enhancing its democratic institutions.
I take this stance because in my study of similar historical cases, I have observed that economic
discontent within a nation’s populace can have the potential to incite a change in the status quo.
These body paragraphs point to excerpts Ziblatt, and Zakaria, used for their research on instances
of successful and unsuccessful democratization. I believe that this research on Egypt is
significant in its subject matter, seeing as Egypt resides in a region that has been a hotbed for
political change in recent years, as seen in the literature regarding the Arab Spring. I chose to
study Egypt’s democratization process specifically because I find that Egypt contains several
cultural, historical, and social traits that are prevalent in several Middle Eastern societies. In this
way, I argue that any conclusions made by this research are applicable to other countries that are
attempting to make a political transition within this highly dynamic region. I discuss these broad
Middle Eastern traits further in my section on the debate surrounding Egypt’s democratic
transition.
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Method (Data Collection and Analysis)
Case- Study Method
This long- term study of the Egyptian Government and its people will most likely to be the most
effective method because I am looking to explain the behavior of this group as a whole, and am
less interested in the behavior of the individuals in the group. I use other democracies as
references in my research, but I am primarily interested in a small number of these references,
which I examine in detail. Although there are nations in Asia and Latin America that have failed
to democratize and also require the attention of scholars, I believe that the sometimes
unpredictable and volatile nature of postmodern revolution in the Middle East demands
immediate inquiry.
Information Analyzed
As mentioned before, the sample that I study is the entirety of the Egyptian Government and
leadership over the course of the Arab Spring and onward. My primary method of collecting my
data is to build off the work of others, as the practitioners of the case study method often do. I
have read analyses of the state of Egypt and its budding democracy, as well as articles pertaining
to its economy in order to determine the related nature of these two elements.
Additionally, I have done research on sites like Country Watch in order to gain an up to date
overview of the state, and view economic trends with the hopes of understanding the patterns of
the Egyptian economy and how it pertains to the quality of its democracy, in terms of
constitutional liberalism. This narrative analysis of Egypt draws from scholarly works in the
disciplines of history, anthropology, economics, sociology, and political science. As I draw on
these works, I compare Egypt’s economic trends/its growth and wane of constitutional
14

liberalism, to a handful of select democratic nations. In my research, I also look at the state of
those economies and the qualities of their democracies in order to establish whether there is any
correlation or causation between these two factors. Reliability and validity will be achieved by
my use of peer-reviewed sources within my work.

The Debate Surrounding Egypt’s Transition
The various lenses that examine this concept include studying democracy’s sustainability
and ability to last in Egypt, as well as the generation of support for democracy and the general
promotion of it in Egypt. For this concept, I also discuss the cultivation of it in Egyptian culture
by American and other western influences. In conjunction with this, it is also important to study
participation and engagement via voting to be able to gauge the amount of time and effort the
people invest into their political system. Ensuring that races are competitive will also be
important, as we observe who runs, and who wins.
Another topic that I discuss within my relevant body of literature is the 2011 Egyptian
Revolution. In my research paper, the specific facets of this political revolt are of great
significance, seeing as this event was the boiling point in the push for Egyptian democracy. The
2011 Egyptian Revolution essentially branches off a larger topic, which is the Arab Spring. The
2011 series of uprisings explains the motivations of the Egyptian people as they pushed for
democracy so intensely. For this reason, discussion on the Arab Spring extends past my
introduction, and is mentioned further in my literature review.
Other concepts that are of great significance include the military and their influence on Egypt’s
political system, along with the part that they played in the most recent uprising. They are a
major institution in the both the revolts that have taken place, as well as the installment of
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democracy afterward. Along with this, the hereditary- style of rule that has dominated Egyptian
politics will also be crucial in understanding how their political system once operated, and why it
needed to change.
Social Media and Egypt’s Democratization
The academic debate in this first group of literature covers a less discussed facet of the
Egyptian Revolution. “Media, Cultural Consumption and Support for Democracy in PostRevolutionary Egypt” by Mazen Hassan and “The Revolution Might Be Tweeted but the
Founding Will Not Be: Arendt and Innis on Time, Authority, and Appearance” by Catherin
Frost, both tackle the subject of social media and the role that it played in the revolution leading
in Egypt’s attempt at democracy. Understanding this is highly important, because if social media
played a palpable role in the attempted installment of Egyptian democracy, some scholars
theorize that it could aide democratization in other Arab states. My thesis demands that I
understand what inhibits democratization, but conversely, it still benefits me to understand what
enhances it in order to search for the absence of these phenomena in my study.
The debate here focuses on how influential social media was in the 2011 Egyptian
revolution. Mazen’s camp claims that social media was a key part of the Egyptian cultural
composition, which allowed the revolution to happen. He states that while there may have been
speedbumps in the use of this technology, it was still vastly superior to the mainstream media
sources that many researchers had hypothesized would play a larger role. Mazen states that
social media generated significant amounts of support for democracy, seen in voter participation,
and easily outperformed its mainstream media counterpart (Mazen, 80). This is enough to
warrant its use in the future and acclaim it as a key part in the regime change, according to
Mazen.
16

On the other hand, Frost argues that social media produced a number of hiccups in the
revolution, and while it was at least able to capture the public’s attention, it is not prepared to be
a working facet of democratization. Frost states that the death narratives that made their way to
the internet negatively affected the image of the revolution, and the personalized nature of social
media often garbled the overall message of the uprising (Frost, 175). While this does not quite
outweigh the role that it played in acquiring salience for the movement, it is still valid criticism
of an imperfect platform.
U.S. Influence on Egypt’s Democratization
The next two sources that share a similar topic are “Democratic Dreams Neglected in the
Land of the Pharaohs: US Democracy Assistance in Egypt” by Barbara Rieffer- Flanagan and
“Egypt and the Middle East: Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and Pragmatic Faith” by Matthew
Crippen. Both of these sources examine the United States’ relationship with Egypt since the
revolution, and analyze the actions by the Obama Administration in order to determine whether
or not the U.S. has been effective in its promotion of democracy to Egypt. These sources share
more common ground than that of the last debate, but still differ in small ways.
Flanagan is hyper-critical of the Obama administration, citing statistics that display
Egypt’s abysmal 5.5/10 score by Freedom House, and states that the enormous amount of
resources that the U.S. is putting into democracy related education and training in Egypt has
relatively nothing to show for it, in terms of improvement in the fields of liberty and human
rights. Flanagan states that the efforts of the Obama Administration were comparable, and
possibly even inferior to those of the Bush Administration (Flanagan, 433).
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Though Crippen admits that the Obama Administration’s rhetoric and approach to
Egyptian relations has fallen short, he takes a different approach in that he still puts his faith in
U.S, and other leaders in democratic, nations stating that that, “A respectful dialogue in which
people from both regions strive to understand conditions giving rise to certain social practices
would be more productive than morally superior attitudes, and help all to see areas where their
respective cultures could be improved” (Crippen, 282). He also cites the shortcomings and
human rights violations that the Egyptian Government has committed despite U.S. engagement,
but believes that without his aforementioned dialogue, Egypt will never be able to overcome its
cultural factors that are preventing it from being a sustainable democracy.
Inherent Obstacles to Democratization in the Middle East
The following trio of articles engage a similar concept. “Sustainable Democracy and the
Paradox of the Arab Spring: The Egypt Experience” by Etemike Laz and “Democracy and
Islamist Violence: Lessons from Post- Mubarak Egypt” by Jerome Drevon examine the
undeniable constants of Middle East society, and create an argument pertaining to how and if
democracy will survive as it struggles against these elements, not limited to: religiosity,
monarchies, military, and fundamentalism.
The first two scholars agree that many concepts within these pillars run counter to
democratic beliefs, and that truly independent democracy may never form so long as there are
such significant influencers, but they take slightly different approaches in their remedy to this
issue. Laz calls for the developing of a framework that will restructure and organize religious,
fundamentalist, and other facets of Arab society without doing away with them, in order to
separate the democratic government from these matters and create a body of government that is
truly independent and beyond the reach of outside forces.
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On the other hand, violence by radical Islamist groups is the key factor that is preventing
an independent democracy from developing, and Islamist groups that have opted to de-radicalize
and begun to adopt less-extreme policies, often eventually opt to join the political process in
order to be heard and voice their principles (Drevon, 2016). This participation is an important
mean of measuring a quality democracy, and Drevon’s de-radicalization approach appears to be
more substantive and detailed than that of Laz. Samuel Hunnington’s “A New Era in
Democracy” reinforces the concrete role that these pillars of society play in certain African
countries. Huntington is of the belief that democratization will not be carried out as long as these
institutions stand. Among these specific institutions, Hunington identifies personal dictatorships,
militarism, regimes, and one- party systems to be particularly problematic, (Huntington, 110).
Military Influence on Egypt’s Democratization
Without its own grouping, “Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military's Attempt to
Manage the Future” by Jeff Martini, argues why the military has elected to pull the political
strings from backstage, rather than take office themselves.
According to the study, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) manipulates seats in the
Egyptian Parliament to appoint many military officials, and reducing the number of civilian
governors in favor of former military and security officers. It has also artificially imposed a
security state in order to keep control of Egyptian society. This was more direct governing than
the author had initially hypothesized, but this was still somewhat of a backseat role, seeing as the
SCAF has shown no interest in hold executive office.
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Resistance to Democratization on Account of Hereditary Rule
Also without a counterpart, “A New Generation of Autocracy in Egypt” by Jeff Martini
explores why hereditary success was such a staunch part the executive branch in the Mubarak
era, arguing that hereditary success was supported by Egyptian leaders due to the fact that
continuing the family lineage supports the current office-holders, and because the current power
of Egypt's lead party allowed them to change election policy to suit themselves. It also played to
the collective benefit of other ranking official in power, according to Martini.
Egypt’s Slow Transition
One last school of thought looks to explain the slow- moving nature of Egypt’s
democratization in another away. “Democracy’s Long Haul” by David Brooks details the
gradual progress that it takes to create lasting democratic institutions. Brooks states that when it
seems that democracy has failed, it may just be taking a long time. As an example, Brooks
mentions that Europe underwent a democratic revolution which collapsed and ended with
violence, and many people of the time thought that this marked the final try for democracy in
Europe, but in a few decades, had moved on to making lasting reform (Brooks, 2).
“The Future of Freedom” by Fareed Zakaria also adds to this discussion concerning the
lethargic pace of democracy, attributing it to the fact that democracy’s success can be directly
tied to other factors, such as the economic wellbeing of a state. “The simplest explanation for a
new democracy’s political success is its economic success- or to be more specific, high per
capita national income” (Zakaria, 69). Although this mention of economy draws closer to the
core of my hypothesis, Zakaria does not specifically tie this link to the Middle East region.
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Egypt’s Support for Democratic Governance Among Poor Citizens:
In a study conducted by the Pew Research Center titled “Democratic Values in Egypt”,
researchers observed growing trend among the Egyptian populace. Pew reports that
approximately sixty percent of Egyptian citizens believe that democracy is preferable to other
kinds of government, but support for this change is diminishing (Pew, 10). The research project
examines Egypt’s democratic institutions, surveying citizens to gain an understanding of the
public’s interest in the different pieces of this emerging government. These institutions included
the judiciary system, the election process, the media, the national economy, and more. The Pew
Center’s results eventually concluded that the majority of citizens placed great significance on
these democratic institutions, and believed them to be important to Egypt’s future (Pew, 12).
Additionally, this is one of the only sources I have found that cites the economy as a factor is
Egypt’s slow democratization effort.
The team of Pew researchers describe the economy to be a potential factor in Egypt’s
democratization process, stating that, “Beyond these political measures, poorer Egyptians show a
greater inclination towards a strong leader. A majority (55%) of low-income Egyptians think a
leader with a strong hand is the best way to solve problems, while only 39% of high-income
Egyptians agree” (Pew, 12). This idea that political, democratic change may be taking a backseat
to the increasing need for economic reform provides support for my initial hypothesis, predicting
that Arab nations facing economic struggle are less likely to democratize. However, this
economic link was not identified to be the primary cause of Egypt’s failure to smoothly
transition into a democratic form of government. Additionally, I found this point raised by the
Pew researchers to be fairly underexplored, as they attributed this economic link to be simply
another contributing factor in the Egyptian populace’s desire for strong leadership. Where I
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initially viewed this connection between Egypt’s national economy and Egypt’s democratic
transition to be the lead factor in its inability to fully democratize, the Pew Research Center
describes the link to be simply another sign that many Egyptian citizens are in favor of strong
leadership. Because the research team identifies this yearning for centralized power in
government to be the main impediment to democratization, I maintain that the gap in the
literature that I previously identified is still valid.
Restate Gap in Literature
Within the literature that I have read and analyzed, only one of the sources specifically
touch on the economic turmoil that Egypt has faced in recent years, and whether or not it has
affected their sluggish democratic reforms, and limited improvement in terms of human rights.
At the time of this study, it has only been 7 years since the Egyptian revolution. Due to the
brevity of this time period, there hasn’t been enough time to thoroughly examine this relationship
between Egypt’s weakened economy, and its slow-moving democratic transition. This is the
main gap that I have discovered in my review of the literature. The studies I have examined take
in to account social media, military influence, past regimes, cultural obstacles, and outside
violence as detractors from Egypt’s democratic efforts, but I have not yet found a scholarly
source that cites Egypt’s deteriorating economic status as a possible explanation for its
unwillingness to reform. The Pew Research study is one of the only resources I have found that
specifically accounts for the Egyptian economy, and although they acknowledge the economy to
be a potential factor, the researchers do not identify this to be the main issue responsible for
Egypt's sedated democratic transition. I believe that this is a possible oversight by researchers,
because the economy can often play a very important role in the voting habits demonstrated by
voters and the public policies passed by lawmakers.
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After reviewing the literature, I plan to look at studies of other countries that weigh the
economy as a factor when measuring the success of democratization in those states. With these
results, I will then assess the current state and trends of the Egyptian economy, in comparison to
that of other nations in the region. The figures on the Egyptian economy will be compared
against experiments that rank and describe the success of Egypt’s democratization. This will
allow me to examine if there is a causal relationship between Egypt’s high inflation
rates/downtrodden economy and their inability to enact lasting reforms or improve the quality of
their democracy (in terms of voter participation, voice, freedoms.)
Case Study Results
Upon concluding my review of the literature pertaining to Egypt’s democratization
process, I have arrived at the conclusion that my initial hypothesis was flawed. Within the above
sources that I have analyzed, I have found little evidence to support the idea that Egypt’s slow
transition to a democratic form of government can be primarily attributed to its ailing economy.
As I progressed through the various studies and journal articles available, I examined literature
on Egypt’s democratization effort analyzed in the context of several different potential
influencers. Among these potential influencers on the democratization process, I analyzed
Egypt’s existing military influence, adherence to hereditary rule, relationship with the United
States, and more.
In my assessment of these numerous and varied influencers on Egypt’s democratic
transition, one particular factor stood out among the rest, proving to be far more dominant in the
prevention of democracy in Egypt. The Egyptian military’s powerful influence on the country’s
political system was a reoccurring theme that consistently appeared across several sources as I
conducted my study. Even within the separate groupings of my selected content, I continued to
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find references to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces’ ability to dictate political action within
government. This has proved to be the most convincing and thoroughly supported explanation as
to why post-revolution Egypt has struggled to democratize. In my analysis, I have ventured upon
a number of key sources that point to Egyptian citizen’s desire for strong leadership in
government. This literature by Laz, Martini, Taylor, the Pew Research Center, and the Country
Watch databases discuss the ever-present role of the SCAF in Egypt’s political realm, and
combine to create a substantial amount of evidence in support of this alternate theory. Rather
than the diminished economy being to blame for Egypt’s democratization struggles, the majority
of the evidence in my analysis points to the Egyptian Armed Forces’ stranglehold on political
power in the country as the primary influencer on this transition. This issue is exacerbated by a
desire for stronger, centralized leadership, exhibited by certain members of Egyptian society.
In addition to the section of content devoted to exploring the military’s influence on
democracy, multiple other content groupings point to the Armed Forces’ disproportionate
amount of domestic power. For example, the content grouping in my analysis that examines the
inherent obstacles to democracy in the Middle East contains several references to this imbalance
of power. This group of sources assesses the feasibility of democracy in nations such as Egypt,
based on certain constant elements that exist within these regions. For instance, Etemike Laz
explores Egypt’s democratization from a historical standpoint, taking into account certain
integral pillars that have long-existed in the region, including religiosity, monarchies, and
fundamentalism.
In Laz’s analysis, he mentions military influence to be a significant inhibitor to
democracy, specifically included among the other “pillars” that stand in the way of
democratization. Laz specifically states that, “The Egyptian military is widely respected by the
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general populace and deeply interwoven into the domestic economy. The military has been a part
of the history of governance in Egypt. They had in 1951 ousted the post-imperial government.
Thereafter the military has been involved in Egyptian politics. After the revolution, the transition
was managed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces(SCAF) composed of senior military
officers who sought to protect its economic and political interest. SCAF further continued to
interfere in many aspect of the transition” (Laz, 49). Etemike Laz’s evaluation of the Egyptian
military highlights the SCAF’s persistent role of power within Egypt’s political sphere.
Additionally, Laz points to evidence suggesting that the Egyptian military’s reach is so
extensive, that the SCAF’s domestic power has also managed to influence Egypt’s national
economy. Most importantly, Laz emphasizes that the Egyptian military is in a position that
allows them to further their own interests, without the threat of dissent or challenge. In addition
to this, Laz identifies this behavior by the SCAF to be reoccurring, observing this trend in 1951over sixty years before the Arab Spring.
Upon reading this excerpt, I was forced to reconsider my original hypothesis. Laz’s
argument successfully identified and explained the intertwined nature of militarism and
governance in Egyptian politics. The author highlights the Egyptian military as a main influencer
on the nation’s democratization process, and then supports the claim by providing historical
evidence. Moreover, Laz’s analysis of the SCAF’s ability to affect the Egyptian economy is also
highly significant in determining the plausibility of my thesis statement. My initial hypothesis
asserted that the weakened state of the Egyptian national economy was to blame for Egypt’s
slow transition to democracy, but upon reading this source, I was presented with an alternative
explanation. I have now been offered convincing evidence, lending credence to my growing
suspicion that even if the national economy is a relevant factor in the obstruction of Egypt’s
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democratization, something larger may be influencing the economy. If this is the case, then my
initial hypothesis pertaining to the Egyptian economy is incomplete at best, having now learned
that Egypt’s economic struggle may merely be a mere symptom of its larger, overarching
problem of military influence in government.
Another group of content that directly references the domestic influence of the Egyptian
military is “Egypt’s Support for Democratic Governance Among Poor Citizens,” located at the
end of my analysis. This section contains the one of the only sources in my analysis that
specifically mentions the role of the Egyptian economy in the democratization process. Upon my
early reading of this source, it seemed as though the study conducted by the Pew Research
Center provided strong evidence in favor of my original hypothesis. In particular, the latter
portion of my thesis statement emphasizes how the Egyptian government’s efforts to reform the
struggling national economy are detracting from their ability to focus on the political institutions
needed to conduct a smooth democratic transition. The study conducted by Pew directly connects
to this, stating that, “Poorer Egyptians are more willing to give up good democratic rule for a
stronger economy. Only 31% of lower-income Egyptians say that they would chose a good
democracy, with 66% wanting a stronger economy instead. High-income Egyptians are split on
whether they prefer good democracy or a strong economy. Additionally, Egyptians who opposed
the 2013 military takeover (56%) are more inclined toward a good democracy than those who
supported it (44%)” (Pew, 12).
Although it would seem that these survey results by the Pew Research team serve to
strengthen the plausibility of my original hypothesis, further analysis led me to believe that the
results may better support my alternate, military hypothesis. Even though the Pew Research team
partly attributes Egypt’s inability to foster democratic values to this economic explanation, the
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national economy is only treated as a symptom of a larger issue. The researchers observe this
economic obstacle to be part of an overarching desire for a strong leader within the Egyptian
populace. Pew reports that the number of Egyptian citizens who are in favor of democratic rule is
actually comparable to the number of citizens who are in support of a more powerful, centralized
government.
Support for Democracy vs. Strong Leader
Total %

Democratic

Strong Leader

Don’t Know

Government
Military removal of
Morsi
Favor

42

55

3

Oppose

68

30

2

Favorable

48

47

4

Unfavorable

57

38

5

Favorable

60

35

5

Unfavorable

46

50

4

View of Sisi

Muslim Brotherhood

Source: Pew Research Center, 2014
In this way, the researchers posit the argument that a large percentage of Egypt’s citizens
are in favor of a stronger government because of their desire for political stability, national
security, and a working economy. As a result of this desire for centralized government, (offered
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by the SCAF military officials,) democratization has proved to be an arduous task at best. This
runs counter to my initial hypothesis that the economic troubles of the Egyptian people are
primarily to blame in the country’s failure to transition. I was again forced to consider the
possibility that Egypt’s economic troubles are simply a part of a larger issue, involving the
military’s ever present role in government. When considering the interwoven nature of the
Supreme Council on Armed Forces and the Egyptian government, combined with this outspoken
push for strong, centralized government among Egyptian citizens, I began to shift my focus
toward a stronger influencer on democratization. Lastly, the Pew study concludes this section by
clarifying that this political opinion has a tendency to manifest itself in particular Egyptian
demographics, stating that, “Preference for a democratic government versus a strong leader is
related to views of the 2013 military removal of President Morsi, as well as attitudes towards the
Muslim Brotherhood and Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. Egyptians who favor the 2013 overthrow of the
government and have a favorable view of Sisi also show greater support for strong leadership”
(Pew, 14).
Unsurprisingly, the portion of my case study devoted to studying the Egyptian military’s
effect on the democratization process also added to the strength of this alternate, military
hypothesis. In “Commanding Democracy in Egypt: The Military’s Attempt to Manage the
Future,” Jeff Martini and Julie Taylor discuss the specific ways in which the SCAF has inhibited
democratization in Egypt. In particular, Martini highlights the Egyptian military’s efforts to
encourage growth among their allies in government, while working to suppress the opinions of
rival groups. The article states, “The SCAF has carefully directed the course of Egypt’s transition
by empowering political forces that do not oppose its dominance or are too vulnerable to try. It
has courted two main partners: the established opposition parties, such as the WAFD Party,
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which have criticized the military on certain policies but have demonstrated loyalty by not
questioning its right to rule, and, more important, the Islamists, including the Muslim
Brotherhood, who share the SCAF’s desire to limit the growth of liberal forces” (Martini, 130).
The Egyptian military’s political behavior as described by Martini, should not be taken lightly.
The SCAF’s efforts to stifle the elements of dissent, debate, and competition needed by
democratic regimes, have dealt an enormous blow to Egypt’s transition. Moreover, the Egyptian
Armed Forces’ use of powerful, fear-inspiring, organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, in
order to cement their position in government, has been incredibly detrimental to Egypt’s budding
democracy. Through this strategy, the SCAF has denied Egypt access to a political system that
allows for the freedom of expression. After taking note of the SCAF’s ever-present role in
government, combined with their ability to maintain control of political power, aided by a
significant push for strong leadership by some Egyptian citizens, the military-influence
hypothesis has the makings of a thorough, persuasive argument.
As I began to recognize a trend in the content that I analyzed, evidence supporting this
particular military hypothesis continued to mount. My original, economic hypothesis was tested
further as I began to conduct research on the Country Watch databases. In order to examine the
plausibility of my initial hypothesis, I referenced Egypt’s economic report on the site’s database
in order to gain a better understanding of how that national economy’s condition progressed or
faltered since the 2011 revolution. I then compared these statistics to a Freedom House report
featured on Country Watch, quantifying political freedom and civil liberty within Egypt. I
referred to this freedom ranking in order to gauge Egypt’s success (or failure) in its
democratization efforts in the post Arab Spring years. I used these two specific reports an
attempt to find a potential correlation between Egypt’s economic turmoil and its inability to
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successfully democratize, but after comparing the data, I found no such relationship. In fact,
Country Watch reports that Egypt’s economy has seen a moderate amount of reform and
improvement in the years since the Arab Spring, enjoying multiple periods of steady
macroeconomic growth (Country Watch, 5). This economic growth however, was not met with
any sort of reciprocation in Egypt’s liberal, democratic values. For example, Egypt’s national
economy improved significantly in 2015, with Country Watch reporting that growth in tourism,
foreign investment, and GDP has taken place in the nation consistently throughout a three- year
period, (Country Watch, 1). Despite these partially successful efforts to revitalize the economy,
Egypt’s freedom house rating remained unchanged in 2015 and 2016.
The Freedom House score ranges from 1-7, 1 being a nation with complete political
freedom, and 7 being a nation with virtually none. Egypt’s abysmal 5.5 rating brands it as a
country labeled “not free” under this index, and is indicative of their failure to establish the
specific institutions necessary for a working democracy. Regardless of whether or not the
Egyptian national economy had improved or worsened during that period, Egypt’s year-to-year
Freedom House rating of 5.5 remained static. Despite experiencing palpable amounts of
improvement in the economic sector during certain years, Egypt’s score saw no change. Not only
did Egypt’s score remain unaffected after a few years of moderate economic recovery, but it
actually worsened in 2018. At the time of this study, Egypt sits at a 6/7 freedom house rating.
Although the absence of a correlation does not eliminate the possibility that economy may be a
lead factor in the Egyptian democratization process, my time on the Country Watch database did
little to bolster my confidence in my original hypothesis.
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Conclusion
After reviewing the available evidence, I have reached the conclusion that my initial,
economic hypothesis is far less supported, and far less convincing than this secondary, military
hypothesis. This original economic hypothesis was only partially supported by one of my
analyzed sources, and even within this study, the researchers downplayed the effects of the
Egyptian national economy on the country’s democratization process. Additionally, the source
places a greater emphasis on the larger, more prominent issue of an underlying desire for
powerful leadership among a large portion of Egyptian citizens. This survey data by the Pew
Research Center enhances the plausibility of my alternate hypothesis, predicting that Egypt’s
democratization efforts are chiefly stymied by the military’s heavy-handed involvement in
Egypt’s political system.
This alternate hypothesis was further supplemented by my content grouping that studied
the inherent obstacles to democratization, native to the Middle East region. This section
identified a deep, historic relationship between the Egyptian Armed Forces and the national
government. The interwoven nature of these two entities was observed to be clearly detrimental
to the democratization process, as the SCAF’s position of power in government consistently
suppressed participation, discussion, and dissent, in favor of advancing its political and economic
interests. Lastly, the content grouping on the Egyptian Armed Forces studies the military’s effect
on the democratization process, elucidating that the SCAF has empowered specific political
entities, with the intent of maintaining total control of the Egyptian government. After
consulting the Country Watch databases and finding little statistical correlation to support my
initial prediction, it became even more evident that my original thesis statement required serious
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reexamination, leading me to identify my alternate hypothesis as the more probable, and more
thoroughly supported argument.
Weaknesses
Potential weaknesses in the study include the fact that as I do my research on sites like
Country Watch, these databases may not be able to account for the ever-changing, dynamic
nature of the Middle East region. Although this is a reliable resource that is frequently updated,
my subject matter focuses on events that are very recent. As a result of this, it is possible that
there are long term influencers on the democratization process that have yet to appear, or to be
accounted for on sites like Country Watch. For example, when I mention that the effects of
Egypt’s economic improvement in 2015 had no visible effect on Egypt’s subsequent freedom
score rating, it is entirely possible that there is a delay in these economic effects, and their impact
on the democratization process may only be apparent in ten or twenty years. In this way,
researchers may eventually discover the state of Egypt’s national economy does indeed have a
larger effect on the democratization process than I perceived. However, because I am interested
in post- revolution Egypt, this is a weakness that I need to accept. Because of my selected topic, I
am not able to observe economic reports from ten, or twenty years ago, as they would fall
outside the scope of this post-revolutionary period. Despite this weakness, I contend that the
evidence presented in my analysis still makes for a stronger argument that Egypt’s military is to
blame in their failure to democratize.
Benefits
The social benefits for carrying out this type of study are immense, being that other
young, budding democracies in the Middle East region will be able to look to a study of this kind
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and see the roadblocks that await them in this post-revolution era, allowing them to prepare in
advance. This could be very fruitful for countries undergoing mass- political change or largescale democratic revolution, because it identifies the mistakes that have been made by Egypt, and
allows them to avoid erring in the same way.
This could also change the viewpoints of the individuals within developed countries who
look down upon, or do not understand people who have not yet achieved a working democracy
that is strengthened by constitutional liberalism. This study would help to explain the obstacles
holding these types of nations back, and remind members of fully democratic societies that we
enjoy many benefits granted by our political system and economy that many others around the
world do not. I believe that many citizens of democratic nations often overlook the rights,
freedoms, and privileges that they enjoy. Moreover, I believe that exposing people to these
studies can raise awareness about the somber reality that citizens of other nations face. This may
create a sense of empathy and an alternate way to look at these struggling states, for those who
do not view them in a favorable light.
Significance
In addition to societal benefits, a study of this nature also contains the potential to change
policies within multiple countries. The findings could alter the way that the Egyptian leadership
manages its economy, possibly influencing it to impose fewer regulations in order to foster
capitalist growth or inversely, to participate more directly with bailouts and stimulus packages.
This study also could modify foreign policy in the United States or abroad, causing
ambassadors and other actors to change their objectives in their diplomatic discussions with
Egypt in an attempt to improve the state of their democracy, based on the findings of a study of
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this kind. For example, a U.N. ambassador working to establish a greater level of political
freedom in Egypt could potentially read this study, and decide to shift their efforts from one
issue area to another. Based on the findings of this analysis, the ambassador could hypothetically
focus less on the developing Egypt’s economic infrastructure, and more on the building of
influential political coalitions that have the means to challenge the SCAF’s place of power in
government.
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